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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
LARRY HOLLINGSWORTH 
d/b/a THE KING'S PALACE & 
RUSTY HANNA, et al., 
d/b/a THE SOCIETY OF 
LICENSED MASSEURS, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
THE CITY OF SOUTH SALT 
LAKE, a Municipal 
Corporation, CLINT 
BALMFORTH & THE SOUTH : 
SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT,: 
Defendants and 
,Respondents. 
Case No. 16,831 
- - -0000000- - -
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
---0000000---
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The Appellants Appeal from a Judgment entered against them 
.~n the Third Judicial District Court of Utah, dismissing their 
Complaint in this action, which Complaint seeks a Declaratory 
Judgment that Sections. 3B-8-3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of the revised ordinances 
of South Salt Lake, 1974, as a~ended, are invalid, the action being 
brought pursuant to §78...;33·1 et seq. U.C~A. (1953) as ·amerided. 
Plaintiffs claim said ordinance sections are in conflict with the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
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Article I; §2, 7 -,- and 18 and Article IV §1 of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah; and various statutes of the State of 
Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, with Judge Homer F.· 
Wilkinson presiding, ordered Plaintiffs' Complaint Dismissed, 
in a Brief Order of Dismissal, dated December 20, 1979. This 
Order of Dismissal was entered based on, and as a result of, 
an earlier Memorandum decision, in the case of Redwood Gym . 
et al, vs. Salt Lake County Commission et al, which Memorandum 
decision declared a similar ordinance passed by the Salt Lake 
County Connnission, to be valid in its entirety. Judge Wilkinson 
Dismissal was made pursuant to an agreement of the parties made 
in an effort to expedite Appeal, after oral arguments had been 
made on the continuation of a Restraining Order against the en-
forcement of the ordinance; and no proceedings have taken place 
on the record. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the Order Dismissing their 
Complaint, and the matter remanded to the Third Judicial Distric 
Court with instructions to enter Judgment for Plaintiffs, declari 
the above mentioned sections of th~ revised ordinances of the 
City of void and of no effect. In the alternative, Appellants 
request this Court to remand this action to the Third Judicial 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs have been operating a Massage Business and 
Health Studio at 6_0 East, 3300 South, in Salt Lake County, 
since 1975. On November 20, 1978, the Salt Lake County 
Gommiss.ion passed an ordinance repealing Title XV, Chapter 
18 of the revised ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as 
amended, and enacting a new Title, XV Chapter 18 of the 
revised ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended. 
This ordinance purported to regulate the business of giving 
massage~,and contained provisions for the issuance of 
licenses,determining whether the premises where massages 
were given were sanitary enough for that purpose, prohibiting. 
certain acts by masseurs, and leveling civil and penal sanctions 
for violations of those proyisions. On December 6, 197 6, at?-
action was filed by the owners o~ several massage businesses 
seeking a Declaratory' Judgment that Sections 3,4,5,7 and 8 of 
the Massage Ordinance were invalid, and seeking injunctive 
relief against the enforcement of those sections. 'A temporary 
restraining .order was issued against the enforcement of the 
ordinance as a whole, but was subsequently limited to sections 
S (1) and 5 (2) of the ordinance, proh~biting the County from 
enforcing only those sections having to do with the proscription 
of opposite sex massages and the consumption or storage of alcoholic: 
beverages on the premises. This limiting of the restraining order 
-3-
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was by mutual agreement, as it was determined by both 
parties that this would be adequate to allow the businesses to 
continue functioning while the legal process determined the 
validity of the ordinance. On December 14, 1979, that case, 
Redwood Gym vs. Salt Lake County Commission, was decided by 
the Third Judicial District Court, Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
presiding, in a short Memorandum decision pursuant to Motions 
for Summary Judgment made by both the business owners and the 
County. The Memorandum decision simply stated "Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment is granted." It then indicated that the 
Restraining Order would be set aside at 5:00 P.M. on December 
19. An appeal of that decision was made shortly thereafter, 
and is now pending before this Court. 
The Plaintiffs in this action, while in similar circumstanc 
to the Plaintiff's in the other action, did not become parties 
thereto, one reason being that the City of South Salt Lake was, 
at that time, invo 1 ved in annexation proceedings to remove their 
business from the jurisdiction of the County. Early in 1979, 
the annexation was completed, and on March 14, 1979, an ordinanc 
was passed by the South Salt Lake City Couno±.1 duplicating.the 
County ordinance, with only minor changes to allow for proper 
administration by the City, as opposed to the County. An oral 
agreement was tentatively made between the owners of several 
massage businesses now in the City of South Salt Lake and the , 
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authorities of that City, that the one section of the ordinance 
having to do with opposite sex massages would not be enforced 
until a decision was-rendered in the Redwood Gym vs. Salt Lake 
County Commission case, thus allowing the businesses in South 
Salt Lake to remain open, as long as they abided by the rest 
of the ordinance~ Late in 1979, that agreement broke down 
amidst charges of Police Harrassment, by the business owners, 
and Countercharges of wide spread violations of other sections 
of the ordinance, by.the City. During October and November of 
1979, six arrests were made of masseurs working in the business 
operated by Plaintiffs for violations of §5 (3) of the South Salt 
Lake ordinance, ·which prohibits the touching of the genitals 
of a customer by a masseur, and offering to·touch. A review 
of the action brought by those massage business owners still 
operating in the County, showed that they had backed away from 
any challenge t~ that specific section of the County ordinance, 
and it was deemed necessary to make such a challenge immediately, 
in connection with the challenge made to the other portions of 
the City ordinance. 
This action was filed on December 10, 1979, and a temporary 
restraining order against the enforcement of the contested 
sections of the City ordinance was issued that day; The Order 
to Show Cause why that temporary restraining order should not be 
made a preliminary injunction was set for hearing on December 
18. At the Hearing on December 18, it was announced by Judge 
- !:\_ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Horner F. Wilkinson that a decision had been reached on the re-
lated County law suit, and that a summary judgment had been 
granted to Salt Lake County, allowing them to enforce the con-
tested portions of their massage ordinance. Argument was made 
at the time on the additional issues- presented by the instant 
case. Judge Wilkinson indicated that it was his feeling that 
there were no substantial differences in the law-suits, 
he was inclined to stand by his decision that the entire 
was valid. He indicated further that he would allow the temper 
restraining order to remain in effect for the rest of the ten 
day period allowed such an order, and then allow it to dissolve 
by its own terms. Since such a decision meant that the City 
would shortly be allowed to enforce the entire ordinance, and 
since the City indicated that it intended to do so, Plaintiffs 
agreed to treat the oral arguments on the hearing for temporary 
relief as cross moticn.s for summary judgment, thus allowing a 
Judgment to be entered, which could promptly be appealed. Ther 
-fore no proceedings were had on the record in this case, which 
was dismissed on December 20. An appeal was filed on ·December 
21, and this Court issued its own temporary injunction against 
the enforcement of the opposite sex provisions of the same 
ordinance du~ same day. Further argument on the continuation of 
such injunction was set for, and made, January 7, at which time 
Court issued a further injunction against the enforcement of 
that provision of 'the ordinance, pending the outcome of this 
case. 
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The contested sections of the ordinance are fully set out 
below: 
Sec. 3B-8-3. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF· A LICENSE. 
Each individual desiring a massage establishirient license 
or masseur license shall: 
(1) Be an individual of at least 21 years of age. 
(2) Make application to the City Council through 
the City Recorder for a business license and 
provide the following material and information 
under oath: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
·The street~ building, and room number 
of the place where applicant proposes 
to give massages or maintaina massage 
establishment. 
Make written dosclosures of all convictions 
of crimes involving moral turpitude within 
the past 5 years. · 
Two duplicate photographs of the applicant, 
measuring two inches by two inches, that 
have been taken within one month from the 
date of the application. 
(3) A certificate from a licensed physician certifying 
that the applicant is free ~rotn conununicable 
diseases. 
Sec. 3B-8-4. SANITARY PREMISES, All applications for a 
massage establishment licertse shall be referred to the Salt 
Lake City Board of Health for investigation and a license 
shall be granted only after a finding by the Salt Lake 
City-County Board of Health that the proposed premises 
are sanitary enough to conduct business therein without 
jeopardizing the public health. 
Sec. 3B-8-5. PROHIBITED ACTS. The following acts are 
prohibited: 
(1) It shall be unlawful for a masseur to administer, 
for hire, to any person of the opposite sex, a 
massage, a fomentation, or a bath. It shall be 
unlawful for any massage establishment licensee 
to cause or permit in or about his place of 
business or in connection with his business, 
an employee to administer a massage upon any 
person of the opposite sex. This section shall 
·not apply to any treatment administered by any 
person licensed to practice a healing art or 
profession under the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, or of any other law of this 
State. 
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(2) 
(3) 
It shall be unlawful to serve, to store, or 
allow to be served or allow to be consumed, 
any alcoholic beve~ages on the licensed prem-
ises of a massage establishment. 
It shall be unlawful for a masseur to touch 
or offer to touch or massage the genitalia of 
customers. 
Sec. 3B-8-7. CIVIL SANCTIONS. Any unlawful conduct, 
whether the omission to perform an act required by this 
ordinance, or the performance of an act prohibited by 
this ordinance, shall be cause for revocation or suspen-
sion of a massage establislun.ent's license or masseur's 
license. The holder of a massage establishment license 
may have his or her license revoked or suspended for any 
and all violations of the provisions of this ordinance 
conunitted by his or her employees. 
Sec. 3B-8-8. PENALTIES. The person convicted of viola-
tions of this chapter of the Revised Ordinances of South 
Salt Lake may be fined not to exceed $299.00, imprisoned 
in the Salt Lake County Jail not to exceed six months, 
or both. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
§5(1) OF THE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IS VOID 
AS BEING AN IMPROPER EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER. 
This section prohibits a masseur from massaging a person 
of the opposite sex, and also prohibits the owner of a massage 
establishment from allowing such conduct. It has been agreed 
by all parties that most massage buslness is by women on men, 
and that this ordinance would eliminate that business. Since 
the ordinance in question here is basically identical to the 
County ordinance passed four months earlier, it is useful to 
look at the minutes of the Public Hearing held by the Board 
of Commissioners of Salt Lake County on November 20, 1978, 
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before passing their ordinance. The Memorandum filed by the 
Salt Lake County Attorney in the Lower Court Proceeding on 
the Redwood Gym vs. Salt Lake County Commission c·ase shows 
clearly the reasoning behind the ordinance: 
The major advocates for the adoption of the ordinance 
were Mr. Curtis Oberhansly, Chief Deputy County 
Attorney and Mr. Nick Morgan, a Captain over the 
Vice Squad for many years in the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office. They each testified that the 
circu..~stances in the unincorpor~ted area of Salt 
Lake County required the adoption of the ordinance. 
Mr. Oberhansly testified that in many cases massage 
parlors are fronts for prostitution and that during 
the preceding six years the Salt Lake County Sheriff 
has tried to control prostit~tion in massage parlors 
by enforcing existing state la.ws, by enacting and 
enforcing new county ordinances and by enforcing 
other laws, but it has been ineffective. Defendant's 
~emorandum, page 3. · 
Quoting from the official Minutes of the Hearing, the 
County Attorney quotes Mr. Morgan as stating the frustrations· 
of his Office in combatting the problem: 
Rarely is the jail sentence imposed. The fine is of 
such a nature that it could be classified as th~ cost 
of· doing business. You talk about prostitution and the 
type of money that is generated from that type of 
activity. The fines that are levied in regards to 
the misdemeanor violations are a mere pittance in 
comparison to what is made, so could adequately be 
classified as a cost of doing business. So obviously 
the State Law and the situation related to massage 
parlors specifically is not adequate because it allows 
a bridge or a situation that takes much more time as 
far as an investigation is concerned that is justified 
by the outcome as evidenced by the tremendous growth 
in massage parlors merely. in the last six months. 
This is not the first attempt on the part of Salt Lake 
County to combat the problems of prostitution by eliminating 
or severly restricting massage parlors. In the case of 
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Jensen vs. Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, 530 P2d. 
3 (Utah 1974), this Court dealt with a Salt Lake County 
Ordinance which required that masseurs or massage parlor 
operators must have practised as massage therapists for at 
least five years, be graduates of a massage and/or therapy 
school approved by the American Massage and Therapy 
Association, or be a fully accredited member of that associa-
tion. The Court, in finding the ordinance invalid, stated: 
At the Trial in the court below a county commissioner 
and a member of the county sheriff's office testified 
that prostitution was the major concern in the adoption 
of the ordinance in question. It is the County's 
contention that it is a valid exercise of police power 
to regulate massage establishments and-to control 
prostitution. We are of the opinion that the County 
does have the power to deal with those matters directly. 
However, the Ordinance unde~ consideration does neither, 
but rather it attempts to set standards and qualifications 
of those persons who intend to engage in a legitimate 
occupation or trade. This is not a proper exercise of 
the police power. At page 4. 
The decision arrived at in that case was unanimous, and 
the opinion was joined in by four of the five Justices of this 
Court. Justic~ Ellett, concurring in the result, stated: 
I concur in the result. The requirements of the ordinance 
in my opinion are too severe to be considered a reasonable 
requirement for a license to operate as a masseuse. There 
surely are masseuses who are moral women. At page 4. 
Apparently not convinced that this Court would not 
approve an ordinance directed at prostitution, but penalizing 
those not engaged in prostitution who are attempting to engage 
in a legitimate business, Salt Lake County passed a further 
ordinance requiring large licensing fees and attempting to 
establish classes of massage operators "intended to make 
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a distinction between theraputic massages and 'pleasure-type' 
massages." Hart Health Studio vs. Salt Lake County, 577 P2d. 
116 (Utah 1978), at 119 .. While the Court invalidated this 
ordinance on the basis that the·classes were arbitrary and 
unreasonable, the Court made some comments which are very 
much on point in the instant case. §15-18-3 of the Salt Lake 
County Ordinance, at that time, read, in part, .as follows: 
Effective January 1, 1977, the following annual license 
fees shall be charged: 
(e) for any massage parlor employing any of the 
masseurs who worked at any massage parlor business 
whose massage parlor license had been revoked within 
the past twelve months., by the Board of County 
Connnissioners: $5,000.00. At page 117. 
The Court, in addressing this section. of the ordinance, 
stated as follows: 
§15-18-3 (e) imposes an annual license fee of $5,000 
on a licensee, whose annual fee but for this section 
would be $250. 
The imposition of this $5,000 license fee is related 
neither to the violation of a coµnty ordinance by the 
licensee who must pay the fee, nor to a violation by 
the employee -- masseur but.instead> is based on a 
violation of an ordinance by a form:er. employer of the 
employee. This class of employees and employers is 
discriminated against and without reasonable relationship 
to eliminating immorality. 
We also believe this section of the ·ordinance is some-
what like the old bills of pains and penalties (special 
acts of a legislature which inflict punis·hment on 
persons without any conviction by the ordinary course 
of judicial proceedings), prohibited by the Utah and 
U.S. Constitutions. The Ordinance clearly penalizes 
the masseur and .his employer without a trial or convic-
tion, and thus is clearly invalid and unenforceable 
under the constitutional provisions cited. At 118. 
Amont the other sections of the ordinance struck down by 
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this decision, were sections dealing with the posting of a 
performance or cash bond by any massage parlor intending to 
allow massage of the opposite sex, in order that the massage 
parlor would, by so doing, guarantee its compliance with the 
general laws of the county. The Court did not reach the 
contention of the massage parlor owner that this was an invalic 
use of the police power, but instead ruled that the classificatj 
scheme of which it was a part, was illegal, and so the ordinanc 
could not stand. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the oppo-
site sex provisions of the new ordinance is as was the previous 
part already cited, "somewhat like the old bills of pains and 
penal ties~' prohibited by both the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, §2 of the Constitu-
tion of Utah. Section 15-8-6(3), standing by itself, is very 
similar to the present §3B-8-5(1) which is contested here, but 
is not as harsh. While that section would have allowed-a 
massage parlor to stay in business, although at some inconv~n­
ience, this present ordinance is assured of putting most, if 
not all, massage operations out of business. 
Both the county and the city do have power to regulate 
businesses in their jurisdictions, although §17-5-27 U.C.A. 
(1953) appears to be broader in giving grants of authority 
to counties than is §10-8-39 U.C.A. (1953) in giving such 
grants to cities. The ability to license and regulate, 
however, does not include the ability to prohibit. (See 
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Combined Communications Corporation vs. City and County of 
Denver, 542 P2d. 79 (Colo. 1975)). Nor does it, of course, 
include the right to make unreasonabl~ and arbitrary regula-
tions, as can be easily seen by the two Utah cases previously 
cited (see also Winther vs. Village of Weippe, 430 P2d. 689 
(Idaho 1967)). The city and county ordinances at issue in the 
two cases under advisement here come before this court as the 
result of a simple inability on the part of the county commis-
sion:. and city council to believe_what the court has told them 
clearly twice before: You must not punish someone for what they 
might do, and if you desire to stop prostitution, stop it 
directly, not by pro hi bi ting businesses in whi_ch ·the opportunity 
for such acts might present itself, if the business operator is 
unscrupulus. 
POINT II 
§3B-8-5(1) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH SALT LAKE 
IS INVALID AS EXCEEDING THE DELEGATED AUTHORITY ~!VEN TO 
CITIES BY THE LEGISLATURE. 
This Court, of course, has ruled in Salt Lake City vs. 
Sutter, 61 U. 533, 216 P. 234 (Utah 1923) that all powers of 
municipalities are derived from the legislature. Those powers 
and duties are found in Title 10 Chapter 8 U.C.A. (1953) as 
amended. §10-8-41 U.C.A. states that cities: 
. may suppress and prohibit the keeping of disorderly 
houses, houses of ill fame or assignation, or houses 
kept by, maintained for, or resorted to or used by, 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
one or more persons for acts of perversion, lewdness 
or prostitution within the limits of the city and 
within three miles of the outer boundar"ies thereof, 
and may prohibit resorting thereto for any of the 
purposes aforesaid; they may also make it unlawful 
for any person to commit or offer or agree to commit 
an act of sexual intercourse for hire, lewdness or 
moral perversion within the city, or for any person 
to secure, induce, procure, offer or transport to 
any place within the city any person for the purpose 
of committing an act of sexual intercourse for hire, 
lewdness or moral perversion, or for any person to 
receive or offer or agree to receive o~ direct any 
person into any place or building within the city 
for the purpose of committing an act of sexual 
intercourse for hire, lewdness or moral perversion, or 
for any person to aid, abet or participate in the 
commission of any of the foregoing; and they may 
also suppress and prohibit gambling houses and , 
gambling, lotteries and all fraudulent devises and 
practices, and all kinds of gaming, playing at dice 
or cards, and other games of chance, and the sale, 
distribution or exhibition of obscene or lewd public-
ations, prints, pictures or illustrations. 
§10-8-51 gives the City further powers in the area of 
prostitution, as follows: 
They may provide for the punishment of tramps, street 
beggars, prostitutes, habitual disturbers of the peace, 
pickpockets, gamblers and thieves, or persons who 
practice any.game, trick or devi.ce with intent to 
swindle. 
As stated by this Court in the Jensen case previously 
cited, the City is not without power to directly prohibit 
and punish prostitution or lewd and perverse conduct in fact, 
if it can be shown that all massage establishments are "dis-
orderly houses or houses of ill fame" or are "kept by, main-
tained for, or resorted to or used by, one or more persons 
for acts of perversion, lewdness or prostitution," they may 
in fact prohibit them. That, of course, the city cannot do. 
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What the city can do, however, is prohibit, by the withdrawal 
<?f business iicense, those specific massage establis·hm.ents 
which are used for illegal purposes. In fact, both the city 
and the county have successfully terminated business licenses 
of massage parlors where there has been illegal- conduct, while 
these actions have been proceeding. The City of South Salt 
Lake has terminated two· business licenses, and .is in._the pro-
cess of terminating at least one more, pursuant to the rights 
of Due Process guaranteed the operators by the State and Fed-
eral Constitutions. Allowing the city to simply prohibit 
this type of business because of what might happen, short 
circuits the entire Due Process guarantee and just assumes 
that anyone involved in that kind of business must be doing 
something improper, and.should be sup.pressed. Plaintiffs 
realize that allowiµg the City to do this would make things 
easy for city authorities,'but basic rights of the people 
may not be abridged for the sake of convenience of the · 
governing authority. 
In addition to· the two statutes cited, the city claims 
authority for this ordinance under §10-8-84 U.C.A. (1953). 
This statute states: 
They may pass all ordinances and' rules, and make 
all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary 
for carrying into effect or di: 1~oha.rrg'ing all powers 
and duties conferred by this chapter, and such 
as are necessary and proper to provide for the 
safety and preserve the health, and promote the 
prosperity, ~mprove the morals, peace and good 
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order, comfort and convenience of the city and 
the inhabitants thereof and for the protection 
of property therein; and may enforce obedien~e 
to such ordinances with such fines or penalties 
as they may deem proper; provided, ·that the 
punishment of any offense shall be by fine in 
any sum less than $300.00 or by imprisonment 
not to exceed six months, or by both such fine 
and imprisonment. 
These same three statutes were ci.ted by the City of Salt 
Lake as authority for passing the ordinance at issue in the 
case of Salt Lake City vs. Allred, 19 Utah 2d. 254, 430 P2d. 
371 (Utah 1967). Defendant in that case was convicted of vio-
lation of a city ordinance of "aiding and abetting in the commis 
sion of a crime in that the Defendant directed a police officer 
to a certain apartment to obtain sexual intercourse for hire." 
At 372. 
There as here, the ordinance was attacked as being beyond 
the power of the city, under the grant of authority given them 
by the legislature. The Court, in answer to that question, and 
specifically referring to the three statutes already cited by 
Plaintiffs stated: 
It will be noted that the first two of the statutes 
above referred to deal with prostitution. While the 
ordinance we are considering contains no definitions 
of the terms used therein, nevertheless, it is quite 
evident that the ordinance was not designed to deal with 
prostitution. The generally accepted definition of 
prostitution is a practice of a female offering her 
body to indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men. 
The ordinance in question g~e~ beyond the grant of power 
by the legislature to the cities to suppress prostitu-
tion. · 430 P2d at 372. 
Further, the Court stated that: 
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It is elementary that municipalities are limited 
by express grants of power from the legislature 
or as necessarily implied from such grants. It 
appears that the ordinance we have under consid-
eration goes beyond the grant that any legislative 
authority granted to the city and is therefore 
invalid. At 373. 
The Court held for the Defendant, the person convicted 
for violating.the ordinance, but later reversed. itself, on 
a petition for re-hearing, (20 Utah 2d 298, 434 P2d (Utah 
1968)) when one Justice disqualified himself, allowing a 
District Court Judge to sit, and tip the balance of power 
in the other direction. The Court appeared then to change 
it's mind on the constrµction of §10~8-84, and state that 
it gave the City much wider power than thos~ powers given 
by §10-8-41, and §10-8-51. ·Judge Cowley, now speaking for 
the Court, stated: 
It is a well settled rule that it is a proper exercise 
of the police power ·as set forth in the above statute 
to preserve and protect public morals, and any practice 
of business which has a tendancy to weaken or corrupt 
the morals of those who follow it, as shown by exper-
ience, is such conduct as affects the public morals. 
434 P2d at 435. 
We are of the opinion that the general police power is 
a sufficient grant of authority .to authorize the city 
ordinance involved in this case unless 'prohibited by 
statute or inconsistent therewith.' at 436. 
This language, of course, .. must be viewed somewhat 
cautious~y, as it was done in a sharply divided case, with 
a District Court Judge deciding the balance of power, and was 
decided well before the Jensen and Hart massage cases. In 
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addition, the Court relied in it's decision in Allred, on the 
absence of conflict between the state statute and the city 
ordinance, and the harmony between them. Not only is there 
no such harmony in this case, but that portion of the second 
-· . 
Allred decision dealing with conflict between state statutes 
and city ordinances has been cut back substantially by 
subsequent Court decisions which will be dealt with later 
in this Brief. In addition, there are observations in the 
dissents of the two Justices who had previously been in the 
majority, worth presenting. Justice Tuckett stated: 
I dissent. After carefully considering ·the main 
opinion and the legal problems raised by this 
Appeal, I am constrained to adhere to the position 
taken in the prior opinion of the Court. I do not 
agree that the general grant of police power to 
the cities by §10-8-84, U.C.A. (1953), was intended 
by the legislature to authorize adoption of the 
ordinance we are here concerned with. It would 
seem that had the legislature intended such broad 
powers it would not have made specific grants of 
power to cities to deal with certain aspects of 
prostitution as provided for by §10-8-41 and §10-8-51, 
U.C.A. (1953). The latter statutes would be 
unnecessary and superfluous. At 438. 
Justice Henriod, supporting Justice Tuckett, stated: 
The two dissenters in the former case cast their 
lot entirely under Title 10-8-41, U.C.A. (1953). 
The author of the opinion in the present case pays 
no attention to those votes, but bases his conclu-
sion entireli on Title lG-8-84, U.C.A. (1953), and 
does not assign 10-8-41 as a basis for his conclusion. 
It would seem to me that this new departure amounts 
to a dissent from the dissenters. Under such cir-
cumstances it appears to be sort of an affirmance 
not reversal of the former case. At 438. · ' 
In the former case Mr. Justice Tuckett simply said 
what every lawyer should know, that cities cannot 
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exercise powers _not delegated.to them by the state 
or its Constitution. Each Justice soundly and 
fundamentally said that the subject Ordinance 
(32-1-1) was an attempt to exercise a power not 
so delegated. At 439, 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that §10-8-84 does 
indeed g_ive additional wide powers to the city to do such 
things as "are necessary and prop·er. to provide for. the safety 
and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and 
good order, comfort and convenience of the City and the 
inhabitants t_hereof, " We are still back where we started. 
This is still not an ordinance necessary or proper in the 
fight against prostitution. It does not deal with prostitu-
tion directly, but deals with it in an indirect manner, which. 
the Court, in Jensen, clearly said cannot be done. This case 
is not analogous to the Allred case, where simp.ly another 
aspect of the pros~itut:Lon business was prohibited. 
·A case involving many of the same issues as are present 
·here was before this Court in the case of Salt Lake City vs. 
Revene, 124 P2d 537. (Utah 1942). In that case, the Defendant 
was charged.with theviolation of a city ordit).ance regulating 
the hours in which a barbershop could ·remain open. Defendant 
demurred to the charge, and both the trial court and Supreme 
Court sustained that demurrer. The city argued that the 
regulation of hours of the business was "valid under the police 
power granted it by the legislature by §15-8-39, 15-8-84, and 
15-8-61 ... "at 538. The statutes cited, under the code of 
1933, were the same statutes now designated as §10-8-39, 10-8-84, 
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and 10-8-61. Section 10-8-39 is the general licens.e and tax-
ing authority, and 10~8-61 allows the city to make regulations 
to "prevent the introduction of contagious, infectious or maH 
nant diseases into the City. " Section 10-8-84, of course, 
is the general statement which has been previously discussed. 
The Court unanimously turned down the city'~ position, which 
the Court characterized as follows: 
It is Plaintiff's position that the above ordinance 
regulating the hours of a barber shop is a valid 
exercise of the police power delegated by the leg-
islature to the city to ''regulate" for the safety 
and preservation of health of the community. The 
Plai~tiff introduced evidence taken at a previous 
time in the form of testimony by barbers and health 
officials to the effect that a "tired barber was a 
negligent barber", tending to afford an opportunity 
for the spread of diseases associated with the 
profession. Further, that from an administrative 
standpoint it was impossible to inspect the barber 
shop after 6 o'clock P.M. at 538. 
The Court then discussed this contention, as follows: 
It has been repeatedly stated by 1;his Court "That a 
municipal corporation possesses and can exercise 
the following powers, and no others: First, those 
granted in express words; second, those necessary 
or fairly implied in or incident to the powers 
expressly granted; third, those essential to the 
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes 
of the corporation, -- not simply convenient but 
indispensable." (citations omitted) at 538. 
The rule making power given to cities in reference 
to barber shops does not mean any rule but such 
rules reasonably related and designed to protect 
the health of the public. at 539. 
A tired barber may be a careless barber but it 
does not follow that all shops which remain open 
more than a certain number of hours engage the 
same barbers throughout the entire period. Barbers 
can work in shifts. If the object of the law was 
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to prevent barbers from getting tired the simple 
way would have been for the legislature to have 
given power to regulate the working hours of 
barbers in shops rather than the hours of barber-
shops. If limiting the hours of barbers is 
encompassed within the phrase "regulate barber-
shops" the city would need no other power from . 
the legislature than it now has to do that. If 
the purpose of the ordinance was to limit the. 
working hours of the operators, granted that 
could be done, the method was too indirect and 
accomplished far wider results than mere limita-
tion of working hours. (citations omitted) at 539. 
The argument that limiting the hours of barbershops 
tend to cut down the number of hours they must be 
policed and thus is a reasonable administrative 
measure to aid in their regulation, is more tenable. 
It would seem that all establishments where human 
beings must repair fo~ work to be done on their 
person might require frequen.t inspection to see 
·that they were kept clean and neat. Section 35-1-13, 
R~S.E., 1933~ evidently had such inspections in_ 
mind "during business hours." Naturally if business 
hours could be limited to fixed hours it would, 
in time, cut down the hours not only when they could 
be inspected but the period during which a proper 
, standard of cleanliness must be maintained therein 
and consequently the periods when the inspectors 
would be required to keep them up to standard. The 
fact that actually there was only infrequent in-
spection of barbershops cannot itself affect the 
fact that ordinarily the less hours a place need be 
policed the less onerous are the.duties of policing. 
Be that as it may, the cases seem to be universally 
against the contention that limiting hours -comes 
within a power to regulate.for the purpose.of 
protecting the health of the public. at 539 .. 
The Court then goes on to cite several cases where hour. 
limitations had been turned down as beyond. the power of muni-
cipal corporation. The power which the City of South Salt 
Lake attempts to exercise over the business operated by 
Plaintiffs, is far in excess of the power attempted to be 
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used by Salt Lake City, in the cited case. In both instances, 
the City has attempted to make its own regulation and police 
job easier, by severely restricting the business that can be 
conducted. In neither case is the convenience of the city 
an important enough consideration to allow them to exercise 
that kind of power. In both cases, the attempted regulation 
is far wider in scope than is necessary or proper to achieve 
the valid protection of society, at which the law is aimed. 
In neither case does the city have the power they have 
attempted to exercise. The City of South Salt Lake should 
therefore be told by thi~ Court t~ once.again attempt to 
achieve reasonable regulations designed to directly achieve 
a goal which the city may achieve, under its limited powers. 
POINT III 
. SECTION 3B-8-5(1) IS INVALID AS BEING IN CONFLICT WITH 
THE GENERAL STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
As has been previously noted, the county has openly 
admitted that its· ordinance is an attempt to regulate sexual 
behavior, and specifically prostitution. The city, not having 
been called upon by the lower court to present any evidence 
at all, but having adopted the county ordinance in its entirety 
can only be assumed to be concerned about the same thing. In 
fact, the Supreme Court of California, in Lancaster vs. Muni-
cipal Court for the Beverly Hills Judicial District of Los 
Angeles County, 494 P2d. 681 (Calif. 1972) found that that was 
the only reason for a similar ordinance passed by the City 
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of Los Angeles: 
There has been-no suggestion of any reasonable 
purpose to the ordinance before us other than to 
limit sexual activity. Although it has been· 
urged that the ordinance should be viewed as a 
regulation of business of administering massages 
and not a sexual regulation, the only specification 
of any actual or potential evil is the sexual 
activity which may follow in the wake of the 
massage. at 683. · 
... the purpose·of the ordinance in question was 
not to regulate ~the operation of massage parlors 
but was aimed at making the task of the police 
department and sheriff's office easier in their 
fight against prostitution and lewd conduct. We 
are satisfied that the ordinance is a regulation 
of the criminal as·pects of sexual conduct. at 683-684. 
This Court has decided many cases involving city ordinances 
which deal-with areas in which the state has extensively legis-
lated. Almost without exception, such efforts by cities have 
been struck down as in conflict with state statutes. The 
State of Utah, in Title 76 1 Chapter 10 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
has spent 60 pages detailing those acts which are "offenses, 
against public health, safety, welfare, and morals." Included 
in that chapter, are part 12 and part 13, dealing with porno-
graphic materials and prostitution. In addition, §76-5-401 
through 407 treat in detait what are referred to as "sexual. 
offenses." As has already been noted, cities do have limited 
power given to them by statute to prohibit and punish prosti-
tution. What· the city is trying to do in the instant case, 
however, is regulate a vastly broader area of sexual conduct. 
If the pronouncements of the deputy county attorney, the 
sheriff's captain, and previous court decisions to the effect 
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that this is sexual regulation can be believed, the act of 
massaging a member of the opposite sex has now been made a 
separate sex crime. Obviously, that does not come under the 
~efinition of "sexual activity" found in §76-10-1301 U.C.A. 
(1953) as amended, which defines it to mean "intercourse or 
any sexual act involving the genitals of one person and the 
mouth or anus of another person, regardless of the sex of 
either participant." If the city of South Salt Lake is attem1 
ing to redefine sexual activity as including massaging member: 
of the opposite sex, the provisions of state and local law 
are in direct conflict. The Supreme Court of Cal~fornia, in 
the Lancaster case, previously cited, bas~d its decision t~t 
this particular sexual regulation was invalid on their decisic 
that the state had pre-empted the field of regulating sexual 
conduct, and that therefore the city was coming into conflict 
with the state in making any such regulation: 
In In re Lane .. . , this Court, after reviewing 
the principles governing the preemption doctrine 
and the numerous statutes governing sexual conduct, 
concluded that the state had adopted a. general 
scheme for the regulation of the criminal aspects 
of sexual activity and that the state had occupied 
the field to the exclusion of all local regulation. 
at 682. 
We conclude that the Los Angeles ordinance which 
is a regulation of sexual conduct must be held . 
invalid because the state has preempted the crim-
inal aspects of sexual activity. at 684. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the earlier Allred decision, 
appeared to agree with the California Court, in stating: 
The State Statutes dealing with sexual offenses 
are comprehensive and all sexual relations except 
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those between husband and wife are declared to be 
unlawful and are denounc·ed as crimes, as an exami-
nation of Chapter 53, ·rritle 76 will disclose .... 
Section 76-53-8 to 76-53-12 deal with pandering 
and prostitution and the incidents related thereto. 
Section 76-53-10 specified a wide range of acts 
pertaining to the soliciting or securing patronage 
or prostitution as well as the procuring of females 
for the process of prostitution. at 373. 
We are of the opinion that the state by enacting 
comprehensive and complete laws pertaining to sexual 
offenses has preempted that field. It do~s not 
appear that the state intended that municipalities 
deal.with these offenses except in those areas pertaining 
to prostitution where the legislature has made spec-
ific grants of authority to municipalities as set 
forth above. at 373. 
However, the Defendant contends in the case before 
us that the ordinance in question i.s inconsistent 
.and in conflict with state laws and therefore invalid 
on the grounds that the ordinanc.e attempts to. make 
crimes of acts which are not crimes under the state 
laws. Assuming this to be true, a careful examination 
of the city ordinance, 32-2-1, Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, and the material sections 
of the state laws pertaining to sexual offenses, 76-53-8 
through 76-53-12, U.C.A. 1953, reveals that both the 
ci.ty ordinance and state statutes have the common 
purpose of defeating the practice of business of pros-
ti.tution ·or the vice of sexual intercourse for hire 
and are closely related in subject matter. The mere 
fact that an act is denounced as a crime under the 
ordinance which is not denounced as a crime under 
the statute would not necessarily render the act 
under the ordinance inconsistent with the statute 
where as here the ordinance is within the $cope of 
the state law dealing with the same rela'ted subject 
of sexual offenses and is no way repugnant to, but 
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on the other hand is in harmony with the state 
laws. We believe the ordinance is consistent 
with the statutes pertaining to sex offense. 
at 436. 
In the Allred case, a woman was convicted of directing 
a police officer to a place and a person, for the purpose of 
prostitution. The Court ruled that this was an act intimately 
associated with prostitution and that the city, in aiding the 
state in stopping prostitution, could make the one extra step 
to make it more difficult for prostitution to flourish. The 
city is not doing that here. They are, instead, making a new 
class of sexual offense, which has only a tenuous relationship 
to the offense of prostitution. They are not attempting to do 
something authorized by the Allred case, but are attempting to 
do something clearly out of harmony and. inconsistent.with the 
state statute, which is therefore invalid, under either Allred 
decision. 
The decision in the 1968 Allred case appears to have been 
cut back in effect almost immediately. In State vs. Salt Lake 
City, 445 P2d 691 (Utah 1968) this Court declared invalid an 
ordinance of Salt Lake City licensing private non-profit social 
clubs. The city had simply copied the state licensing require· 
ment, changing only enough words to make it apply to city offi· 
cers, rather than state officers. The Court quoted extensively 
from Abbott vs. City of Los Angeles, 3 Cal. Reptr. 158, 349 
P2d 974 (Cal. 1960) in stating that: 
The invalidit¥ ar~ses, not fr~m conflict of language, 
but from the inevitable conflict of jurisdiction 
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which would result from dual regulations covering 
the same ground. Only by such a broad definition 
of "conflict" is it possible to confine local 
legislation to its proper field of supplementary 
regulation. 445 P2d_ at 694. 
Further commenting on problems of allowing the city to 
regulate the private clubs in the m.anner they were attempting 
to do, the Utah bourt said: 
Thus the lines of conflict on the instant action 
emerge, since the ordinance, as enacted by the city, 
is an encroachment upon the state's exclusive right 
to determine the qualification of thqse entities who 
shall be entitled to operate as state chartered non 
profit clubs or associations. There is a conflict 
of jurisdiction because the effect of the ordinance 
could result in the city's forbidding what the 
legislature has expressly licensed, .authorized, or 
required. at 6.94. 
Thus, if the state has already regulated the area, the 
conflict of jurisdictions is sufficient to keep the city from 
regula t.ing the same area.· Here, of course, we have a much 
wider area of conflict than was deemed sufficient to hold 
the law invalid in State vs·. Salt Lake City. 
In Allgood vs. Lars.en, 545 P2d, 530 (Utah 1976) the Defend-
ant was convicted of violation of §32-3-3 of the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City. That ordinance made the crime of trespass 
a class B misdemeanor. Section 76-6-206(3) of the Utah Code 
made the same crime an infraction, for which no jail sentence 
could be imposed., The criminal Defendant successfully obtained 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, 
and that Writ was upheld in this Court. The Court, in upholding 
the Writ, declared: 
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The district court ruled "that since the :state 
law provides no jail sentence for trespass, which 
is classified as 'an infraction,' that the city 
cannot impose a greater sentence than that pro-
vided by state law, and it is for that reason 
that the Court grants the petition for a Writ 
of Habeas Corpus." With this we agree and 
affirm the trial court. 
Salt Lake City seeks to exceed the public policy 
declared by the legislature relating to a new 
class of offense. It does not have that power 
of amendment. at 532. 
Further, the Court quoted from McQuillin; Municipal 
Corporations, §17.15, at page 326, in declaring the law in 
Utah: 
. . . If the ordinance penalty conflicts with that 
of the general law of the state covering the same 
subject, the ordinance penalty is void. The 
charter ordinance penalty cannot exceed that of_ the 
state law. at 532. 
Justice Crockett, in dissent, stated as follows: 
The legislature has specifically granted authority 
to the city to prohibit criminal trespass by 
§10-8-50, Utah Code Annotated 1953, wherein it 
states that cities have the power to: 
. . . provide for the punishment of trespass and 
such otner petty offenses as tne board of c6mmissioners 
or city council may deem proper. at 532. 
In other words, the majority of the court ruled that a 
city may not decide the punishment of a crime, when that 
punishment appears to conflict with the state pronouncement 
on the same subject, even though there is a specific grant 
of authority for. so setting the penalty. The state, then, 
by making a later pronouncement of public policy, is deemed 
to have overruled its earlier pronouncement that cities 
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exercise sp.ecific grants of power. In this case, the state 
has defined the perimeters of what- is and is not illegal 
sexual conduct, and any previous grant of power to the 
city, is not sufficient to override what the state has pro-
nounced. 
In the case of Layton City vs. Speth, 578 P2d 828 (Utah 
1978) Defendant was convicted under a city ordinance which 
duplicated the language of §58-37-8(2) (2ii) which stated 
that it shall be unlawful: 
For any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in 
control 9f any building, room, tenament, vehicle, 
boat, aircraft, or other place, knowirig.ly and 
intentionally to permit the same to be occupied 
by persons unlawfully possessing; using, or 
distributing controlled substances therein. 
The Court, apparently returning once again to the more 
strict construction of the statutes granting legislative 
-· 
authority to the cities which characterized the earlier 
opinion in Salt Lake City vs. Allred, ruled the ordinance 
must be set aside, in the following language: 
At the time of the alleged offense the statutes 
of Utah permitted cities certain powers including 
a prohibition against" ... the sale, giving away of 
furnishing of intoxicating liquors or narcotics, 
or of .tobacco to any person under 21 years of 
age; ... ". The statute has since been amended 
but the amendment has no bearing on the present 
case. 
Cities are also empowered by statute to pass all 
ordinances, rules, and regulations for carrying 
into effect all powers and duties conferred and 
"such as are necessary and proper to provide by 
the safety and preserve the health, and promote 
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good 
order, comfort and convenience of the city and 
the inhabitants thereof, ... ". 
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The ordinance in question is not one which is 
necessary for carrying into effect any of the 
purposes above mentioned. at 829. 
While, then, the second Allred decision appeared to give 
cities a grant of authority to protect safety, health, morals, 
peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the city, 
which grant of authority was in addition to the many specified 
grants, the Layton. City vs. Speth decision, appears to make 
that position untenable. In fact, in that decision, the 
Court very clearly made a rather strict interpretation of 
what the city can and cannot do in the area of drugs. The 
Court clarified its view of city powers even further, in 
stating: 
By the statute it is clear that the only authority 
given to the city was to prohibit anyone from 
selling, giving away, or furnishing mariju~na to 
a person under twenty-one years of age. Mr. Speth 
is not charged with doing any of those unlawful 
acts; and that part of the ordinance which attempts 
to make it unlawful for a owner of an automobile, 
knowingly and intentionally, to permit persons to 
occupy it who possess, use, or distribute marijuana 
must be held to be beyond the power of the city to 
enact. The ordinance is, therefore, invalid. at 829. 
Although the Court then went on to determine that there 
was a conflict in penalties, in that a second offense under 
the state statute was treated more harshly than a second 
offense under the city ordinance, it is clear that the Court 
did not make its decision based on the difference of penalties. 
The Court made its decision based on the fundamental decision 
that the city did not have a wide range of additional police 
powers not specifically granted in Title 10 Chapter 8 of the 
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Utah Code. Obviously the city could, and probably did, 
argue that such an ordinance was protective of the publtc 
health, safety, and morals. In fact, assuming that the 
state was correct in labeling marijuana a dangerous drug 
in the first place, such an ordinance on the part of the 
city may well have exercised the protective functions that 
the city stated as justification. Nevertheless, the ordi-
nance was both beyond the power of the city to enact, lacking 
a specific grant of authority, and was in conflict with 
state regulations in the area .. The ordinance at issue in 
the instant c~se is also both beyond the power of the city 
to enact and in direct conflict with the state statutes 
defining public policy on the issues of sex offenses. 
Before leaving this subject, a brief reference should 
be made to §76-10-1201 through 1226, U.C.A. (1953) as amended, 
in which the State .of Utah takes a strong stand against public 
displays of riudity and other sexual activities. In this 
series of statutes, the state legislature recognized that it 
w~s ~nacting a comprehensive scheme of regulation regarding 
pornography and similar offenses. It therefore, in §76-10-1210 
specifically gave authority to the cities to further regulate 
the.materials complained of. It does not appear the legisla-
ture felt that the cities would have such authority without the 
specific delegation of that statute, dispite the language 
of §10-8-84 seemingly giving the cities broad authority to 
improve the public morals. The legislature wanted it clear that 
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cities have the right especially to protect minors against 
materials which might otherwise be too readily available for 
them. It was the intent of the legislature, as specifically 
stated in §76-10-1210(3) "to give the broadest meaning permis 8. 
able under the federal and state constitutions to words 
'offends public decency' in §76-10-803." Section 76-10-803 
defines a "public nuisance" but note that such broad language 
is confined to the area of pornography, pkohibited by the abou 
cited statutes. No such broad declaration on the part of the 
legislature has been enacted to give cities like authority 
in the area at issu·e here. That can only be due to a decision 
on the part of the legislature that the conduct they have 
proscribed was the proper proscription to be applied to 
consentual adult activity in a non-public place. 
POINT.IV 
SECTION 3B-8-5(1) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH SALT 
LAKE DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN VIOLA-
TION OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 
AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 2 AND 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STAT 
OF UTAH. 
Since the similar ordinance of Salt Lake County, containing 
identical language to this contested section is also here on 
appeal and since the brief of appellants in that matter exhaust· 
ivly treats the subject, the appellants here will be concise. I 
I 
In doing so, however, we do not downplay the importance of these: 
legal arguments, and ask the Justices of this Court to carefullY 
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read the arguments of Counsel in the companion case, so as to 
fully consider the issues presented. Ordinances similar to the 
' ones at issue here have been litigated extensively in the last 
ten years. Attacks on such ordinances on federal constitutional 
grounds have concentrated on the following points: (1) that the 
opposite sex massage prohibition creates a sex based classi-
fication without rational basis or compelling in.terest there-
fore, contrary to the equal protection clause of the 14th Amend-
ment; (2) that the opposite sex massage prohibition infringes 
on the fundamental right to .. pursue a legitimate occupation, 
contrary to the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment; 
(3) that the opposite sex mass~ge prohibition creates an 
irrebutable presumption that p~rsons mas·saging persons of the 
opposite sex will engage in illicit sexual activity, an 
irrational presumption which denies due process of law contrary 
to the.14th Amendment; and (4) that t;:he opposite sex massage 
prohibition is overbroad in its effect when there are. less 
restrictive means of achieving the same obiective (prohibition 
of prostitution). thus rendering the ordinance void as a denial 
of due process, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
For many years the landmark case on the constitutional 
issues brought up by this type of ordinance was Ex. parte Maki, 
113 P2d 64 (Calif. 1943) stating that the fundamental rights 
of the -massage parlor owners and workers were not abridged by 
such ordinance. The effect of that decision was overruled in 
Lancaster vs. Municipal Court· for the Beverly Hills Judicial 
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District of Los Angeles County, a 1972 California Supreme Court 
decision previously cited in this brief, which found such ordina 
invalid as intruding into areas preempted by state legislation. 
Since the ~aki decision, a number of other courts have ruled 
on the same points. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in 
Smith vs. Kea tor, 206 S. E. 2d 203 (N. C. 197 4) ; the Supreme Court 
of Virginia, in Kisley vs. City of Falls Church, 187 S.E.2d 168 
(Va. 1972); and a New Jersey intermediate appeals court, in an 
unreported decision of January 29, 1974, upheld such ordinances. 
Most courts did not. See J. S. K. Enterprises, Inc. vs. City of 
Lacey, 4 93 P 2d 1015 (Wash. app. 197 2) , Corey vs. City of Dallas 1 
3 52 F. Supp. 977 (N. D. Texas 197 2) , Cianciolo vs. Members of Cit~ 
Council, Knoxville, Tenn., 376 F.Supp. 719 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), 
Valley Health Systems, Inc. vs. City of Racine, 369 F.Supp. 97 
(E.D. Wis. 1973). The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in deciding the case of 
Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. vs. Rizzo, 387 F.Supp. 690 
(E.D. Pa. 1974) at page 695, found the trend towards finding 
such ordinances in violation of the 14th Amendment, overwhelming. 
That Court, of course, also found the ordinance of the City 
of Philadelphia invalid. A development in the United States 
Supreme Court, in 197 5, seemed to put a halt to such decisions. 
That Court ruled, in Hicks vs. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S .Ct. 
2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 233 (1975) that a dismissal in that Court for 
want of a substantial federal question was to be treated as 
dispositive of the merits of the issues. In other words such 
' 
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a dismissal after contentions that an ordinance violated the 
14th Amendment, was in effect, an indication that such an ordi-
nance did not violate the 14th Amendment. That was important to 
this line of cases in that the three cases previously cited as 
upholding similar ord.inances had all beE7n appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court, and all three had been so dis-
missed. The Colorado Springs Amusements case, pre-yiously 
cited, was_ then overruled by the Third Circuit C.oµrt of Appeals, 
based on the Hicks vs. Miranda .decision~ See Col6rado Springs 
Amusements Ltd. vs. Rizzo, 524 F.2d 571 (3rd Cir. 1975). That 
decision was followed by similar C'iircuit .Court dec:Ds.ions. in 
Hogge vs. Johnson, 526. F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1975) and '.~omlinson 
vs. Mayor and-Aldermen, 543 F2d 570 (5th Cir. 1976). While 
it appears that the United.States Supreme Court has, to this 
time, been-unwilling to rule that an ordinance such as the one 
contested here ·is in violation ,of the United States Constitu-
tion, and other federal law relied on in part in the Cianciolo 
and Corey cases, that Court has certainly not specifically 
denied such.relief. The Hicks case came after all three appeals 
to the Supreme Court had been made,.and the effect of the 
Hicks case has then been used retroactively, to achieve the 
result in the cited Circuit Court cases. 
There has been some discussion by legal schola~s to the 
effect that the Supreme Co~rt wishes to decide no more sexual 
discrimination cases until a final determination is made on 
the passage of the equal rights amendment. Utah has its own 
.. 
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version of the equal rights amendment, in Article IV, Section 
1, of the Constitution of Utah, which states, in. part " ... 
both male and female citizens of this state shall enjoy equally 
all civil, political and religious rights and privileges." 
That provision of the Utah Constitution certainly appears to 
give far more protection against irrational sexual classifica-
tion than does the equal protection clause of the 14th Amend-
ment. Utah of course, has its own Equal Protection and Due 
Process requirements, found in Article I, sections 2 and 7. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado, in the one major develop-
ment to have occurred in this area of law since the above 
cited cases, decided the case of City and Count~ of Denver 
vs. Nielson, 572 P2d 484, in 1977. That Court used its own 
state constitution to find the ordinance at issue in that case 
unconstitutional. The Court stated: 
Regardless of the Third Circuit Court's decisions 
in Colorado S rin s Amusements Ltd. vs. Rizzo, Supra, 
states may interpret t eir own constitutiona 
provisions to afford greater protection than 
the Supreme Court of the United States as recog-
nized in its interpretation of the Federal 
counterparts to state constitutions. at 485. 
The Denver ordinance is not a reasonable regula-
tion. It creates an unreasonable, arbitrary, and 
unconstitutional conclusive presumption, in viola-
tion of Article II, Section 25 of the Colorado 
Constitution. The ordinance is unduly oppressive 
to legitimate massage practitioners and goes 
beyond the means reasonably necessary to accom-
plish the legitimate objective of preventing 
illicit sexual behavior .. Alternative, constitu-
tionally permissable methods of curtailing sexually 
illicit behavior are available to legislative 
bodies. at 486. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has plenty of Constitutional 
grounds in its own Constitution, including the additional 
prohibition against sexual discrimination, on which to rule 
this ordinance unconstitutional. Recourse, however, does 
not even need to be made to the constitution, but can be 
made simply on statutory and decisi~nal groun~s, as laid 
out in detail in previous points of this brief. 
POINT V 
SECTION 3B-8-5(1) OF THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IS IN 
VIOLATION OF THE UTAH ANTI DISCRIMINATION ACT AND UTAH 
CIVIL RIGHT STATUTES. 
Once again, this contention is treated exhaustively in 
the brief of Plaintiff-Appellants in the companion case of 
Redwood Gym vs. Salt Lake County Commission. Plaintiffs 
here do not have much to add to that exhaustive treatment, 
and simply state here that this ordinance violates §34-35-6 
U.C.A. (1953) as amended by illegally forcing massage esta-
blishments to hire only male masseurs, as it has been agreed 
that clientele is almost exclusively male. Plaintiffs right 
now employ both male and female masseurs, and do not discrim-
inate on the basis of sex in either hiring or providing 
services. 
POINT VI 
SECTION 3B-8-5(3) IS INVALID AS BEING BOTH BEYOND THE 
DELEGATED POWER OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND IN DIRECT 
CONFLICT WITH STATE STA1'UTES. 
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In addition to the provisions of the South Salt Lake 
massage ordinance relating to opposite sex massages, there 
is a provision creating yet another sex crime, that of 
"touch [ing] or offer [ing] to touch or massage the gen-
italia of customers." The criminal penalty for a violation 
of this section is a possible six months in the Salt Lake 
County Jail and/or $299.00 fine. This section does not 
directly affect the right of Plaintiffs to continue an 
existing business, but it affects currently pending criminal 
charges. The Society of Licensed Masseurs, a partnership 
which is a party to this action through its managing partner, 
Rusty Hanna, is a group of masseurs employed at the King's 
Palace. Society members Debbie Hanna, Julie Hanna, Pamela 
Cabey, Susan Rosvall and Shauna Bauer have been charged with 
violations of this ordinance, and the criminal proceedings 
are pending, as of the time this brief is written. Plaintiffs 
have previously made the arguments in this brief, that the act 
of massaging a member of the opposite sex has been designated 
as a new sex crime, and that the city has both exceeded its po~ 
and come into conflict with general state laws, in so doing. 
section of the ordinance under discussion here suffers from 
the same defects, but the conflicts with the state law are eve~ 
more clear. The public policy of the State of Utah regarding 
illegal sexual activity is clearly defined in §76-10-1301 et~ 
U.C.A. (1953) as amended. §76-10-1301 defines "sexual activitl 
and "house of prostitution" as follows: 
_")Q_ 
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(1) "Sexual Activity" means intercourse or any 
sexual act involving the genitals of one person 
and the mouth or anus of another person, regardless 
of the sex of either particpant. 
(2) "House of Prostitution" means a place where 
prostitution or promotion of prostitution is 
regularly carried on by one or more persons 
under the control, management, or supervision 
of another. 
§76-10-1302 U.C.A. (1953) as amended then goes on 
to prohibit prostitution in the following words: 
(1) A person is guilty of prosti,tution when: 
(a) He engages or offers or agrees to engage 
in any sexual activity with another person 
.for a fee; or 
(b) Is an inmate of a "house of prostitution; 
or 
(c) Loiters in or within view of any public 
place for the purpose of bein hired 
to engage in sexual activity. 
(2) Prostitution isa class B misdemeanor, provided that 
any person who is twice convicted under this section 
shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
It could easily be argued,. under the doctrines set forth 
in, Layton City v·s. Speth, that any regulation of pr'os-
titution whatsoever on a local level is now void, as being 
in conflict with the state law. The penalty phase, seen as 
sufficient conflict in both the L'a'yton· Gity 'vs'.' Speth and 
Allgood vs·.· LaYsen cases, must be in di~pute, as cities have 
no power to pass ordinances punishable on a second offense, 
as a class "A" misdemeanor. While that issue is not directly 
in front of the Court, a very simila~ issue is. Salt Lake 
County has enacted section §16-23-4 of their revised 
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ordinances, defining and punishing prostitution. The act 
reads as follows: 
§16-23-4. Prostitution. 
(1) Any female person who performs, solicits, 
offers or agrees to perform any of the 
following acts for money or other con-
sideration commits an act of prostitution: 
(a) Any act of sexual intercourse; or 
(b) Any act of deviate sexual conduct. 
(2) Deviate sexual conduct for the purpose of this 
section means: 
(a) Any act of sexual, ratification involving 
the sex organs of one person and the mouth 
or anus of another. 
(b) 
(3) A person convicted of prostitution shall be fined 
not to exceed $299.00 or imprisoned in the County 
Jail not to exceed six months, or both. (Emphasis 
added). 
Salt Lake County, then, has passed an ordinance in direct 1 
conflict with the prostitution statute of the State of Utah. In 
all areas of the state outside of Salt Lake County, prostitution 
means one thing, and in Salt Lake County, it means far more. 
Even the most tortured reading of the second Al1r'ed decision 
does not give the county authority for doing this. The fact that 
the ordinance was passed long before the new criminal code 
defining what prostitution is in the State of Utah, would seem 
to read a simple over-ruling of the county by the state. Going 
back to the second Allr~d decision, the majority of the Court, 
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upon re-hearing, stated: 
There is nothing in the state statutes regulating 
sexual offenses that evidences any express or implied 
intent to preclude local governments from also 
attempting to prohibit and suppress the difficult 
problem of the sex offender. Therefore, it is our 
opinion that the city is not precluded in enacting 
the ordinance in question unless it is inconsistent 
or in conflict with the states statutes dealing with 
sex offenses. At 436. 
A redefining of prostitution to include matters that 
the state decided were not prostitution, is both inconsistent 
and in conflict with the state statutes. The county clearly 
has no authority to pass this ordinance. 
The 'county, in passing their version of §3B-8-5 (3) (their 
number 15-18-5(3)) were restating their obviously invalid view 
of prostitution. Whereas some might contend that the opposite 
sex provisions of the new ordinance'were designed to "prohibit 
and suppress the difficult problem of the sex offender" as 
defined ·by the state, §5(3) of the county of city massage 
ordinances is directly in conflict with the state law. It is 
not designed to suppress something the state has declared to be 
prostitution. It is either a direct frontal assault on the state 
statute, or, in the alternative, simply an anachronism from the 
time before the state passed its comprehensive Act on the subject, 
in 1973. While the state, in addition to its prostitution laws, 
prohibited certain unnatural sex acts, ';1nder the heading of"Sodomy" 
(§76-5-403) and also prohibited adultry (§76-7-103,' and fornication 
(§76-7-104) the decision was clearly made that the conduct defined 
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as prostitution and deviate sexual conduct by the county, 
was not a crime. The county prostitution ordinance, 
and this portion of the county massage ordinance, are not 
intended to attack "the difficult problem of the sex offender'' 
because, in fact, a person engaging in the conduct prohibited 
by the ordinance section at issue here is· nbt a sex offender. 
The city, in adopting the county ordinance regarding the toi 
of members of the opposite sex, adopted the county's invalid · 
decision as to what is and is not prostitution. The city, 
however, has even a further problem, which the county does not 
have. The city has now clearly denied masseurs the Equal Protec 
of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment the United 
States Constitution, and Article I, §2 of the constitution of 
the State of Utah. There is no law in the city of south Salt 
Lake, or any other community, outside of the unicorporated area 
of Salt Lake county, that I can find, which makes it a crime for 
two people' married or unmarried, for a fee or not for a fee, to 
touch each other wherever they please, as long as both consent, 
it is not done in a place open to publi~ view, and no sexual 
contact as defined in state statute, results therefrom. Therefo 
if a person is licensed as a masseur, he is subject to imprison· 
ment for the same kind of conduct which any other person may 
engage in with impunity. This then renders §3B-8-5(3) of the 
revised ordinances of South Salt Lake null and void as in direct 
conflict with the constitutions of the State of Utah and the 
United States. 
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lt is appropriate here to refer to the case of rn· ~ Lane, 
372 P2d.897 (Calif 1962) in which the Court stated as follows: 
Defendant was convicted of the crime of "resorting," 
after a court trial in the Municipal Court for the 
Los Angeles Judicial District on two charges of 
violating §51.07 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, 
which provides: "No person shall resort to any 
off ice building or to any room used or occupied 
in connection with, or under the same management 
and any cafe, restaurant, soft drink parlor, liquor 
establishment, or similar businesses, or to any 
public park or to any of the buildings therein or 
to any vacant lot, room rooming house, lodging 
house, residence, apartment house, hotel, house 
trailer, street or sidewalk for the purpose of 
having sexual intercourse with a person to whom 
he or she is not married, or for the purpose of 
performing or participating in any lewd act with 
any such person. At 898. 
The court, on page 899 of the decision lists numerous 
acts of sexual intercourse which_have been made illegal by the 
state, and then goes on to list lewd acts in public places, 
crimes against children, indecent exposure, obscene exhibitions 
and acts against public decency as being outlawed by the state 
of California. Defendant was accused of going from her own 
living room to her own bedroom "for the purpose of having 
sexual interc;:ourse with a male to whom she was not married." 
(At 898) The court stated: 
Although living in a state of cohabitation and 
adultery is prohibited, neither simple fornication 
o·r adultery alone nor living in a state of cohabitation 
and fornication has been made a crime in this atate. 
(citations omitted.) 
Accordingly, a city ordinance attempting to make 
sexual intercourse between persons not married to 
each other criminal is in conflict with the state 
law and is void. At 900. 
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In this state of course, sexual intercourse between 
unmarried persons has been made a crime, although rarely 
enforced. The mere touching without sexual contact, has not 
been made a crime. The city may not add numerous new 
sex crimes to what the state legislature has declared is the 
public policy of this state. 
POINT VII 
§3B-8-5(3) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH SALT LAKE 
IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
It is settled rule of law that a statute written so 
vaguely that it does not set out a clear standard df the beh~im 
prohibited, is void as a denial of due process of law. That 
standard was set out, among other places, in Chainplln Refining Co 
vs. Corporation Gom,286 US 210, 76 L Ed. 1062, 52 S.Ct. 559 (193l 
where the United States Supreme Court said: 
In light of our decisions it appears upon a mere 
inspection that these general words and phrases are ~.o 
vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for their 
violation constitutes a denial of Due Process of law. 
It is not the penalty itself that is invalid, but the 
exaction of obedience to a rule or standard that is 
so vague and indefinite as to be really no rule or 
standard at all. (Citations omitted.) 52 S.ct. 
In the Jensen vs. Salt Lake County case, previously cited, 
the court ruled an earlier version of the Salt Lake County 
massage ordinance void for vagueness, in the following 
language: 
The trial court was of the opinion that the language 
of the ordinance was so vague and uncertain as to 
render it invalid. We conclude that that determination 
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by the trial court was correct. A person who 
might wish to enter the field covered by the ordinance 
would be unable to determine from its wording.what 
qualifications or skill would be necessary to 
qualify for a license. It is noted that the ordinance 
uses the term "massage therapist" but nowhere is that 
term defined. At 4. 
At first glance, the ordinance at issue here seems to be 
deceptiv?lY: simple and clear. Litigation undertaken under 
this ordinance in the Justice Court for the city of South 
Salt Lake, indicates that the ordinance is not quite so clear. 
In a juzy trial held in that court on February 25, "1980, a 
masseur working at the King's Palace was charged with the crime 
of: 
"Unlawful massage on November 25, 1979 at or about 60 
West, 3300 South, King's Palace Health Studio at .or 
about 8:15 P.M~ in violation of city ordinance Title 3B, 
chapter 8, §3B-8-5(3), in :that said Defendant, acting 
as a masseur, did offer to touch or massage the 
genitalia of a customer, t.o wit: special South Salt 
Lake officer Cliff Dye. (Complaint No. 79-6559, · 
Justice Court of South Salt Lake, in the matter of 
City of South S'a1t L'ake vs. St:t's·an· Ma·e· Ro'sVa11). 
Defendant, through counsel", submitted the following Jury 
instruction defining the crime charged: 
The Defendant in this matter is charged with violation of 
§3B-8-5 (3) of the ordinances of South Salt Lake which 
states "It shall be unlawful for a masseur to touch 
or offer to touch or massage the genitalia of customers." 
The ordinance is designed 'to prohibit· a commercial sexual 
business'. In order to confict the Defendant, you must 
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that she offered to 
massage the genitals of the complaining witness· 'fo'r a 
· ·fee, and the offer was immediate in nature in that she 
wa:8" to perform the act ·at the time ·Bind p1·a·ce· the agre·ement 
was m·a'de. · 
The court, having heard objections from the c~ty of South 
Salt Lake on several phases.of this instruction, gave the instructio 
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to the jury, minus the underlined portions. The Court then, in 
effect, ruled that the ordinance did not require the act to be a 
conunercial act for a fee, ·and that the offer to touch need not 
be confined to the massage establishment. Under the interpretati 
of the South Salt Lake City Justice Court, a masseur who accepts, 
date from a customer, even if she may have known him before, and I 
the date offer contains any language relating to possible physic, 
affection, may have violated the law. That interpretation doesn 
sound reasonable, but it appears to have been made by a court 
charged with interpreting that ordinance. 
In a subsequent action in the same court involving another 
masseur, where the charging part of the complaint was substantial 
the same, counsel submitted the following proposed instruction: 
You a:J;e instructed that the word "offer" according to 
Black's Law Dictionary, means "To present for accept-
ance or rejection." 
The Defendant in this matter is charged with offering 
to touch the genitalia of a customer. You may find 
the Defendant guilty of that act, if you believe that 
she has offered, according to this definition. If, 
however, the police officer made the offer, and no 
actual touching took place, the Defendant is not 
guilty. 
The Court rejected this instruction outright, after objectio 
by the city, in the apparent assumption that the word "offer" 
could be interpreted, as the city contended, to include the 
acceptance of someone else's offer. Again, this appears to be a 
simple misinterpretation of what the ordinance says, but a court 
of competent jurisdiction has so interpreted it, thus leading 
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to the inescapable co!lclusion that the.ordinance is so vague as 
to lend itself to such tortured interpretations. 
In the case of Stat~ vs. PeterSbn, 560 P2d. 1387 (Utah 1973) 
the Defendant.was charged with Forceable Sexual Abuse, in that 
he touched "the genitals of another with the intent to arouse 
his own sexual desire, without the consent of the other," in 
violation of §76-5-404 U.C.A. (1953) as amended. The Court 
ruled at that time that the Defendant had touched the genitals 
o_f the victim, despite the uncontroverted evidence that the con-
tract was made through a layer of clothing. (See page 1390-1391). 
While in a prosecution for a sexually motivated assault, such a 
tight prohibition may have merit, such interpretation of the 
word "touch" in construing. this.ordinance would allow a masseur 
to be convicted for a mere brushing passed the genitals of a 
customer, even though the customer may be fully covered with a 
towel, as is the practice at the King's Palace. Unlike the 
obviously invalid prostitution ordinance of Salt Lake County, 
this ord'inance do·es not require ·an.v ·intent thus allowing lower 
courts a wid~ latitude as to what kind of conduct can be proscribed 
under it. Reading the ordinance so as to not require any kind of 
sexual intent for a conviction, certainly renders the ordinance 
so vague and over-broad as to constitute a denial of D-q.e Process 
of Law. 
POINT VIII 
SECTIONS 3B-8-3, 4, 7 AND 8 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF 
THE CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE ARE'INVALID BECAUSE THEY ARE 
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UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, BEYOND THE DELEGATED POWERS GIVEN 
TO MUNICIPALITIES BY THE STATE OF UTAH AND ARE IN CONFLICT 
WITH UTAH STATUTES. 
While the two ordinance sections discussed at length pre-
viously are the most onerous portions of this ordinance, other 
sections are also invalid. Section 3B-8-3 states requirements 
for issuing licenses to both a massage establishment and a 
masseur working in such an establishment. While §10-8-39 and 
10-3-40 appear to give cities the power to license a massage 
establishment, as any other business, nowhere is the power given 
to license those who work' in the massage establishments. It 
is established legal doctrine that a state statute conferring 
licensing power on a city is to be strictly construed and any 
doubt resolved against the city. See McCarthy vs·. Ci'ty of Tucson1 
255 P. 329 (Ariz. 1924). Since it nowhere appears that the city 
has specific authority to license masseurs employed in a massage 
establishment, this portion of the ordinance should fail completel 
Even assuming that the city does have this licensing power, this 
section of the ordinance appears to be so vague as to come under 
the proscription previously cited in the· Jensen case. A careful 
reading of the licensing portion indicates only that a masseur 
must make an application to the city council through the city 
recorder, must provide certain information specifically asked 
for, and must be 21 years of age. It is also established doctrine 
that licensing ordinances or statutes are to be strictly construed 
when they deal with the right of someone to pursue his chosen 
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occupation. See Roberts vs. State Bd. of Etnba1tn·e·r·s an'd Fuheral 
Directors, 434 P2d 61 (N.M. 1967). A strict construction of that 
ordinance could render it constitutional,,by indica_ting that the 
c.ity has no power to refuse licensing to anyone who has filled 
those simple requirements. The city, in several cases to date 
however, has. assumed more power. The city council has assumed 
that it has t;:he_ ~ow~r to de_cide the fitness of a person, depend-
ing on the information received pursuant to the ordinance. Such 
a wide discretion in the city council, the licensing authority, 
~ renders the licensing ordinance invalid for failure to state 
comprehensible ·standards, also pursuant to the· Jen·sen case. 
The city council then has the power to be as arbitrary ·and 
capricious as it wishes with no standards on which its perform-
ance is to be judged. 
In addition, the requiremen.t that a masseur be at least 
21 years of age is in direct conflict with Utah State Law which, 
iri §15-2-1 (1953) as amended, states in the relevant part, 
"the period of minority extends in males and females. to the age 
of 18 years; but all minors obtain their majority by marriage." 
Wh,ile certain rights of adults are specifically withheld until 
19 or 21 (e.g .. rights to smoke and drink) by the state, no 
municipality has the right to decide under what circumstances 
a person should be treated as an adult,· and what cir~umstances 
he may not. That area is clearly preempted by the stat~. 
" Therefore', §3B-8-3, of the massage ordinance, becaus~ of various 
assumptions of authority and conflicts with state l~w, is 
-49-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
invalid in its entirety. 
Section 3B-8-4 of the Revised Ordinances of The City of 
South Salt Lake gives the unbridled power to the City-County 
Board of Health to decide when the premises of a massage esta-
blishment are "sanitary enough" to conduct 'business. For the 
reasons enunciated above, the statute is invalidly vague as it 
does not state comprehensible standards, and allows complete 
arbitrary and capricious descretion to a regulating authority. 
Sections 3B-8-7 and 8 of the Revised Ordinances of South 
Salt Lake, ·the civil and criminal penalties sections, are invalid 
as they allow a massage establishment owner to lose his license 
or be convicted of a crime due to not what he has done, but what 
his employees have done. Since by the very nature of the busi-
ness, massages are given out of the view of the public on a 
"one on one" basis, a ·massage establishment owner cannot ·have 
full control over what goes on between a masseur and a customer. 
All he can do is his best to check on them and educate them 
as to what is allowed and what is not allowed. If he has done 
this , he has done his duty under the law. This ordinance section 
is in conflict with §76-4-201 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, in that 
it defines a new conspiracy-type offense. The law is plain on 
what conspiracy is, as stated in the cited statute: 
. . . a person is guilty of conspiracy when he, 
intending that conduct constituting a crime be 
performed, agrees with one or more persons to 
engage in or cause the performance of such 
conduct and anyone of them commits an overt 
act in pursuance of the conspiracy . . . . 
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If .the ordinance allowed conviction or revocation of license 
only after conspiracy ~as proven, it might well be valid. The 
fact that it now permits punishment for no crime at all, renders 
it clearly invalid as another example of the "bills of pain and 
penalty" prohibited by Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah. 
POINT IX 
SECTION 3B-8-5(2) IS AN INVAL_ID ATTEMPT BY THE CITY TO 
REGULATE LIQUOR, AN AREA OF LAW PREEMPTED BY THE STATE. 
In the companion case of Redwood Gym vs. Salt Lake County 
Commission, the memorandum filed by the County Commission in 
attempting to get summary judgment in the lower court, stated, 
in point VI, page 23, 
The Defendants concede that §15-18-5(2) purports 
to limit the places where liquor can be ·stored and 
sold and that it is invalid because the state pre-
empted the, area governing the siting of liquor 
stores. 
Plaintiffs allege in paragr~ph 8 of their Complaint 
that §15-18-5(2) of the ordinance is invalid becau~e 
Salt Lake· County does not have the authority to 
regulate in the area of liquor control. Section 
15-18-5(2) of the ordinance provides "It shall be 
unlawful to serve, to store~ or allow to be served, 
or allow to be consumed, any alcoholic beverages 
on the licensed premises of a massage establishment." 
The State of Utah does have general authority over 
the sale and storage of liquor and the language of· 
§15-18-5(2) could be construed to be in conflict 
with the province of the state. 
The Defendants cannot in good conscience oppo'se an 
order determining §15-18-5(2) to be invalid as it 
is presently enacted. 
The lower court did not respond to the County's conces-
sion that this section of the ordinance is inv~lid. They have, 
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however, so conceded and the ordinance should be struck down 
based on that. Since the city has copied their ordinance 
word for word from the county, it can only be assumed that 
they will also concede that point, and this ordinance section 
should be declared invalid. 
POINT X 
THE ENTIRE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE ORDINANCE, SECTIONS 
3B-8-1 THROUGH 3B-8-10, SHOULD BE DECLARED INVALID, BECAUSE 
THE PROVISIONS ARE INTERRELATED. 
It is the general practice of legislative bodies in this 
country to include a severability clause in any multi facited 
piece of legislation, to assure that the valid provisions will 
remain in effect, if invalid portions are found by courts, and 
stricken. It is established law, however, that a piece of 
legislation in which major interrelated sections are invalid, 
can and should be stricken in its entirety. This was clearly 
stated in the case of State· vs.· S'alt Lake Clty, previously 
cited, where this Court stated: 
Finally we are confronted with the issue of the 
effect of the severability clause contained in 
§20-29-25 of the ordinance. This Court has pre-
viously held that even where a savings clause 
existed, where the provisions of the statute are 
interrelated, it is not within the scope of this 
court's function to select the valid portions of 
the act and conjecture that they should stand 
independently of the portions which are invalid. 
At 696. . 
Almost the entire working sections of this ordinance are 
clearly invalid for one reason, or many. Therefore, this ordinanc 
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in its entirety should be declared invalid and the City of South 
Salt Lake should be told to write an ordinance which permissi-
bly regulates, but does not invalidly restrict or surpress the 
legitimate business of giving massages. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the Third Judicial District Court dismissing 
Plaintiff's Complaint should be reversed, and the matter remanded 
to the Third Judicial District Court with instructions to enter 
judgment for Plaintiffs declaring §3B-8-l through 3B-8-10 of the 
Revised Ordinances of the City of South Salt Lake void and of 
no effect. In ·the alternative, this action should be remanded 
to the Third Judicial District for proper evidence taking, during 
which time the Third Judicial District Court should be ordered 
to take appropriate steps to prevent Defendants from enforcing 
the ordinance. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this· ;l.·V~ay of March, 1980. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed 2 true and.correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to Clint 
Balmforth, Attorney for Defendants, 2500 South State Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, this· ·~c/-+"day of March, 1980. 
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